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REOPENING OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CLAIMS-
ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS PENDING REOPENING
PROCEEDINGS
By JomN FprrT STEWART*
Upon its own motion or upon the application of either party,
the Workmen's Compensation Board may reopen any award or
order upon a showing of a change of condition, mistake or
fraud.' Generally, one of the parties is seeking a change in the
award. If a change of condition is alleged, the party attempting
to reopen the order or award must file affidavits executed by
the interested party setting forth the reasons why the award or
order should be reopened. Frequently included is an affidavit of
an examining physician. The motion to reopen, with accompany-
ing affidavits, should be served as any other pleading.2 The oppor-
tunity for response to such motion will be considered if it is
served and filed at any time prior to the date of the meeting of
the Board on such a motion.8
If the Board in considering the motion and accompanying
affidavit determines that there is sufficient merit to warrant a
hearing on the issues raised by the pleading, it then refers the
case for a hearing on the issues raised by the pleading, as well as
any other matters it feels would probably come before it following
such hearing.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has stated in effect that if,
even after an award or an agreement between the parties reciting
something less than total disability, the claimant's condition is
obviously worse or he is totally disabled, then that original settle-
ment or award was grossly inadequate and erroneous and the
Board is charged with the responsibility of correcting this error.
The Court also holds that whether the indicated grounds were
* B.S. & L., University of Louisville, 1958; J.D., University of Louisville,
1960. Partner, Segal, Isenberg, Sales & Stewart, Louisville, Kentucky.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 342.125 (1960).
2 Workmens Compensation Board Rules and Regulations (WCB 4-3).
3 WCB 4-e
4 Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. v. O'Bryan, 414 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. 1967);
Messer v. Drees, 382 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1964).
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mistake or change of condition is an irrelevant matter of Se-
mantics. Consequently, a claimant could move to reopen on a
ground of change of condition and the failure to allege the ground
of mistake would not preclude the Board from exercising its
power to reopen the award on the ground not plead, if it were
found to exist.
After the full hearing procedure has been completed, and
the record has been reviewed in its entirety, the Board may then,
within the limits provided in the Act, increase, decrease or
terminate the compensation previously awarded.5 There have
been awards made where as a result of a change of condition,
for example a neurosis developing after a traumatic injury which
had been improperly diagnosed at the time of the original
proceeding, the claimant later became totally disabled.6
ENFORCEMENT OF AN AwARD PENDNG
BEOPENING PROCEEDINGS
The section of the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act
entitled "Enforcement by Circuit Court of Agreement or Award"7
has run the gamut of judicial interpretations. The statute pro-
vides:
Any party in interest may file in the Circuit Court of the
County in which the injury occurred a certified copy or
decision of the Board.... The Court shall render judgment
in accordance therewith and notify the parties.... Any such
judgment, unappealed from, or affirmed on appeal or modified
in obedience to the mandate of the Court of Appeals shall be
modified to conform to any decision of the Board ending,
diminishing or increasing any weekly payments upon presen-
tation to it of a certified copy of such decision. .[Emphasis
added.]
In Stearns Coal and Lumber Company v. Duncan," the Court
of Appeals ruled that the Act required the Circuit Court to
I KRS § 342.125.
6 Mayes v. Potter & Brumfield, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. 1968).
7 ICRS § 342.305 et seq.
8 113 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1938).
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enforce the Board's award, even if motions for reopening were
being considered by the Board, until a new order was filed with
the circuit:
[T]he sole purpose of section 4939 Kentucky Statutes [now
§ 342.305] is to enforce the agreement approved by the Board,
or the order, decision, or award of the Board, if unappealed
from, or affirmed on appeal. Where, as here, that is the
situation, all that the Circuit Court can do to enforce the
agreement, decision, or award, no matter how erroneous it
may be.9 [Emphasis added.]
But two of the latest decisions do not give full force and effect
to the legislative directive that the award should be enforced
until there is a final order changing the award.10 The present
effect of the plain language of KRS § 342.305 is that ordinarily
the recipient of an award or claimant party to a Board approved
agreement may enforce the award or agreement by merely filing
a certified copy of same with the circuit court of the county in
which the injury occurred. This is an ex parte procedure and no
summons should issue. The court is then directed to enter judg-
ment and notify the parties of the entry of judgment. This
judgment has the same effect as though it has been rendered in a
suit duly heard and determined by the court.-" However4
although the claimant is entitled to collect his benefits by enforc-
ing this judgment, the employer can cause the process to be
abated by filing a motion to reopen with the Board, subject only
o Id. at 437. The Court further said:
The award being valid, all payments go as a matter of course, and thefailure to adjudge future payments will not be given an effect contrary
to the award, or the judgment upholding the award. However, no reason
is perceived why the Court, in order to facilitate the collection of the
compensation, and also void useless expenses, may not, as in actions on
insurance policies providing for payment in monthly installments,
adjudge a recovery not only of past-due payments, but all future pay-
ments subject to the vacation or modification of the award. [Emphasis
added.]10 Perry v. Frankfort Electric and Water Plant Bd., 448 S.W.2d 383 (Ky.
1969); Scheurich & Fritz Roofing Co., Inc. v. DeWitt, 424 S.W.2d 390 (Ky.
1968).
1 Fruchtenicht v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 451
S.W.2d 835, 837 (Ky. 1970). If the Insurance carrier had not been named
in the original award sought to be enforced, summons must issue against the
Insurance carrier in the circuit court.
[Vol. 59
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to the penalties of being required to pay the costs (KRS §
342.310) if the procedures were instituted without reasonable
grounds. 12
In one of the two cases mentioned above, Scheurich & Fritz
Roofing Company, Incorporated v. DeWitt'3 the Court offered
lamely that:
The employee can obtain some measure of protection against
this by having his award reduced to judgment immediately
after the award is obtained and by diligently enforcing pay-
ment.14
However, it is obvious that this type of proceeding lends no
assistance to the claimant who is unable to adequately provide
for his family once the employer has filed a motion to reopen
with the Board. But lending assistance to the worker with an
injury "arising out of and in the course of his employment" is
the purpose of the Act. Thus, the Court's construction does
violence to both the spirit, and the letter, of the Act. As a Rhode
Island court said about the type view now held in Kentucky:
An employee is ordinarily dependent upon the weekly wages
for his livelihood. A disabling injury through accident arising
out of and in the course of employment deprives him of this
income and ordinarily makes him greatly dependent upon
whatever compensation he is entitled to receive under the
Act. If an employer, purely on its own judgement, can de-
fault, in the payment of compensation to an injured employee,
and while so in default, can invoke and receive affirmative
assistance to his own advantage, then the object of the act will
12 See Perry v. Frankfort Electric & Water Plant Bd., 448 S.W.2d 383 (Ky.
1969). In that case the employer had ceased making payments prior to applying
for reopening. Thereafter, the employer ified a motion to reopen, an objection
filed by the claimant was sustained and the Board did not permit the case to be
reopened. The claimant filed an action in the Franklin Circuit Court to enforce
the award and to require the payments to be continued and after the case had
been set for a hearing, on the very day of the hearing, the employer filed a
motion with the Board to reopen again, and simultaneously filed a motion in
Circuit Court to abate the action pending the reopening proceedings. The Circuit
Court ordered the abatement and the Appellate Court upheld the order. This
was an instance in which there were two unappealed from awards, yet it was
impossible to enforce either of them.
Is 424 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1968).
14 Id. at 392.
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be substantially defeated. This is unjust to the injured em-
ployee, whom the Act primarily intends to protect.15
And as Judge Milliken said in dissent in the other principle Ken-
tucky decision referred to above, Perry v. Frankfort Electric and
Water Plant Board:16
The majority opinion is unrealistic because it throws the
burden and expense on the claimant to persist in obtaining
payments under an award of the Board rather than on the
employer to move to discontinue payments because of a
change of condition, etc. The majority view is illogical too,
because it permits an employer, in effect, to alter an award
simply by discontinuing payments under it which, in this
respect, permits the employer to pre-empt the normal power
of the Board itself.
I believe the proper construction to place on the language of
KRS § 342.125 to the effect that any order of the Board 'dimin-
ishing, ending or increasing' a previous award 'shall not affect
the previous order or award as to any sums already paid
thereunder' should be premised on the assumption that the
amounts due under the previous award were paid when due.
The inclusion of the word 'increase' in the Statute makes it
possible for the Board to retroactively increase the weekly
amounts due but not actually paid if the majority's con-
struction of the Statute is correct.' 7
It is because of such reasoning that in many other jurisdictions
the appropriate rule is contrary to that in Kentucky.
The few cases which have been concerned, directly or indi-
rectly with the question annotated have held or subscribed
to the view that the employer or insurance carrier cannot of
its own initiative, and without following the procedure out-
lined in the Compensation Act, terminate payments provided
for by an agreement executed between the employer and
15 Hingeco Mfg. Co. v. Haglund, 14 A.2d 233, 235 (R.I. 1949) (emphasis
added).
16448 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1969). Judge Milliken concluded:
I continue to think that our opinion in Scheurick & Fritz Roofing Co. V.
DeWitt, Ky. 424 S W.2d 390 is an incorrect interpretation of the Statute
and for that reason I think the majority opinion here, based as it is on
Scheurich is equally incorrect. Id. at 384.
17Id. at 384.
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employee and approved by the Director of Labor or other
officials designated in the Compensation Act.'8
A return to this rule, as earlier enunciated in Stearns, would
make judicial interpretation again consistent with legislative in-
tent and would again make the recipient of an award safe until
the employer was successful in having the award modified.
18 129 A.L.R. 410, 418 (emphasis added).
